MEMS Seminar: Iterative Mechanisms for Electricity Markets

Sep 14

Wednesday, September 14, 2016

12:00 pm - 1:00 pm
Fitzpatrick Center Schiciano Auditorium Side A


Professor Alfredo Garcia, University of Florida

We consider the problem of designing the rules by which dispatch and payment to electricity market participants are gradually adjusted while taking into account network and reliability constraints so as to ensure the market clears with an efficient outcome. Small adjustments (which require minimal information from market participants at each iteration) facilitate the identification of incentives for ensuring truthful reporting of private information. We propose a class of iterative mechanisms and show this class exhibits many desirable properties: incentive compatibility, efficiency, individual rationality and (weak) budget balance. We also analyze an iterative mechanism for stochastic market clearing, a pressing need given the increasing penetration of highly intermittent renewable generation technologies. In this case, the marginal cost of adjustments may only be estimated with some error. We show that truthful reporting is a Nash equilibrium and the resulting dispatch converges almost surely to the efficient dispatch.Lunch will be served from 11:30 am - 12:00 noon


Siler, Katherine